the most common of all kinds of reasoning, and is altogether suited to man's habits of observing and thinking. Every man is obliged to proceed on the argument, in the acquisition of necessary secular knowledge, and in the discharge of the ordinary business of life.

may with certainty be inferred from marks or signs of it In the effect. This is the principle we have been considering, and we may call it the major proposition of the argument. The second, which we call the minor proposition, is, that there are in fact the clearest marks of design and wisdom in the works of nature; and the conclusion is, that the works of nature are the effects of a wise and intelligent cause. One must either assent to the conclusion, or deny one or other of the premises." (Essay vi. c. vi.) The French Atheistical school, headed by M. Aug. Comte, would at times cast doubts on the second proposition, and explain away some of the supposed marks of design, dwelt upon by writers on natural theology. But in doing so, it may be remarked invariably, that they only succeed in referring a given adaptation to a more general cause; and they do not seem to reflect that w\, are ready to follow them thither, and to point out the adaptation *there*, possibly under a double form, or one adaptation adjusted so as to produce another. When we point, ftn* instance, to the eye, as showing such thought, such care, such refinement, such advantage taken of the properties of natural agents, '* and fitted," as Sir John Herschel remarks, "to force upon us a conviction of deliberate choice and premeditated design, more strongly perhaps than any single contrivance to be found in, nature or art," the Atheist contents himself with saying, that the eye is produced by that law of nature according to which children resemble their parents; and he forgets that we follow him from the child to the parent, and there discover the very same adaptation; with this farther adaptation, that the parent's frame is so constructed as to be able to produce an offspring after his own likeness. And all the miserable cavils of the Atheistical school leave a host of traces of design undented and even untouched. As the second proposition cannot be denied with any appearance of plausibility, they set themselves with most vigour to attack the first, and represent all the apparent traces of design as mere " conditions of existence." " The provision made for the stability of the solar system," says M. Oomte, "is no evidence of a final cause. The pretended final cause reduces itself, as has been Been on all analogous occasions, to this puerile observation—there are no stars inhabited but those that are habitable. They return, in a word, to the principle of the conditions of existence, which is the true positive transformation of the doctrine of final causes, and of which the fertility and bearing are vastly greater." If there be any logical force in this

remark, it must bo held as affirming that no adjustments, however numerous and strikingly applied to secure an end, can be held as evidential of design. Now let us apply this to tho common illustration. We lift a watch, found lying on a bare common, and examine it, and are about to conclude that it must have had a maker, when M. Comte comes to us and assures us that all this adaptation of wheel and axle, of hand and figure, is but the condition of the existence of the watch. True, *iim* the condition of the existence of the watch, but it is a proof too of a designing mind arranging the condition. Wo certainly hold the remark to be sufficiently "^puerile," and the sneer reared upon it to be sufficiently profane. "At this present time, for minds properly familiarized with true astronomical philosophy, the JieaveiiM ills-